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MOBILIZING LABOUR FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN G O D  MINTS: THE RECRUITIMG 
OPERATIONS OF THE !CFfAI?SVllAL OF MINES IN SOUTH CHINA, 1903-1905 
by 
Peter Richardson 
Amid the controversy which still surrounds the reasons for, and consequences 
of, the use of Chinese indentured labour in the Transvaal gold mines between 1904 and 
1910, one aspect of the character of the emigration has yet to receive the emphasis 
and study it deserves. The overwhelming majority of Chinese who worked in the Rand 
mines were fyom the rlorthern parts of China, particularly the provinces of Shan-M 
and ChWJ-, (1) Out of the 43,296 labourers actually shipped to South Africa in the 
first year of recruitment, only 1,741 came from the south-east of China, the 
traditional source of Chinese emigration. (2) As the numbers of Chinese going to the 
Rand increased, this regional imbalance became more marked. That this was largely 
unexpected ma;y be judged from the institutional arrangements which were made in the 
Transvaal. The first Superintendent of the Foreign Labour Department, William Evans, 
was chosen specifically for his knowledge of the southern Chinese dialects,acquired 
through his dealing with the Chinese communities in the Straits Settlements. Not 
until June 10, 1905, almost a year after the first shipment of Chinese mine labourers 
arrived in South Africa, was the Transvaal government able to claim that it had a 
protector of Chinese who was able to speak the same language as the majority of men 
under his charge. (3) 
'Phe significance of this northern Chinese character of the emigration to 
the Transvaal should not be underestimated. Administrative chaos in the Transvaal 
was only the most obvious result. (4) It seemed also to inaugurate a reorientation 
in the pattern of Chinese emigmtion under contract: the lmge-scale use of Chinese 
labourers by the British and French armies in the First World War was based to some 
extent on the ographical and institutional precedents set by the Transvaal 
experiment. (5r The volume of indentured Chinese emigration from southern Chinese 
ports in the period 1904-20 is markedly less than in the first phases of the 
development of the traffic, between 1845 and 1874. (6) That this was to some extent 
the result of earlier developments enhances the importance of this change. (7) 
Attempts to explain the interaction of events in north and ~outh China and 
assess their significance in the determination of the character of the emigration to 
the Transvaal have so far been inconclusive or unsatisfactory. The evidence is 
scattered and has only been made available over lengthy periods of time. Thus the 
writings of Campbell (a), Meyer (9 ) ,  and Reeves (10) all have some omissions which 
are directly attributable to thisi Unfortunately, not all problems in these writeru 
interpretatione stem from this source alone. Reeves's treatment is pmticularly 
disappointing. With a greater range of source material available to him than to any 
previow writer, he attributed the evident opposition in the south of China to 
emigration to South Africa simply to Chinese nationalism, and "effete inefficiency 
and petty corruption". (11) Denoon likewise makes unwarranted assumptions about the 
character of Chineoe emigration to the Transvaal witinout any attempt to evaluate 
critically the evidence he cites. (12) 
This paper is an attempt to assess critically the fact of a predominantly 
northern Chinese emigration to South Africa in the light of the historic preponderance 
of southern Chinese emigration and the experience of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines 
in the more faliar labour market of south China. In so doing, an analysis will be 
made of the degree to which the move away from the traditional sources of labour 
supply in China was forced on the Chamber of Mines, It is hoped that some light will 
be thrown thereby on the interests through which the mining capitalists were forced 
to operate, and on the interests which were arraigned against them in the period 1903- 
1905. It is hoped also that something will be shown of the nature of the co-operation 
between state and private enterprise in the development of the post-Boer War mining 
industry in an unusual setting. This essw is not concerned with the techniques of 
labour recruiting in detail, although these are unavoidably mentioned in passing. 
These are better left to a comparative study of labour mobilization practices in north 
and south China. (13) It is more concerned to explain why  the traditional forces of 
Chinese emigrant labour mobilization - poverty, speculative foreign capitalism and 
state power - did not produce their expected result: a stream of southern Chinese 
mine workers for the Transvaal gold mines. 
Southern China, it has been suggested, was the natural focus of the Chamber 
of Mines if their search for an alternative or supplement to the African labour supply 
was to be centred on China itself. More particularly, the two southernmost coastal 
provinces of Kwaqptung and Fukhien were the acknowledged sources of emigmnt labour. 
By 1905 the systems of mobilization were well established. The patterns of movement 
from the interior, the institutions set up to exploit and control the trade, and the 
government agencies, both Chinese and foreign, designed to control but not curtail the 
business, were so familiar that they failed to attract any widespread comment from 
observers, except in more sensational cases. From Pakhoi in the south up as far as 
Shanghai, the open ports were well acquainted with all the sordid trappings of this 
lucrative business. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the trade had 
become centred on four of the treaty ports open to foreign trade: Canton and Swatow 
in Kwangtung and Amoy and Foochow in Fukhien, and on the British colony of Hong 
Kong. From the port of Amoy alone in 1904, 69,587 Chinese passengers were conveyed 
to Singapore, the Straits Settlements and liangoon. (14) Competition between Japanese 
shipping firms and the German Nord Deutscher Lloyd Company for a monopoly of the 
emigrant traffic was described by the British Consul at Swatow as a "war to the 
knife". (15) It is evident that though the pattern of Chinese emigration f m m  these 
entrepats had been somewhat restricted geographically by the advent of anti-Chinese 
immigration laws in certain hitherto popular countries (161, .the volume of the trade 
remained remarkably large, and the pmfits likewise. 
In this pattern of emigration the British colony of Hong Kong played a 
crucial role. Not only was it a large centre of emigmnt traffic; at the end of 1903 
the colony boasted fifty licensed whotels" and sixteen eniigration houses. (17) It was 
also of great strategic importance as a transhipment port. The excellent facilities 
of the harbour as a deep sea port, its proximity to other sources of emigrant traffic, 
and its freedom from the arbitrary interference of local Chinese officials, made it in 
one sense the ideal entrep8t. Hong Kong governments had, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, m m o  combine in almost perfect form ostensible control and 
actual laxity, sufficient to protect and encourage mercantile houses in the emigrant 
business without frightening off those whose escape from unendurable poverty was flight. 
Butterfield and Swire, the Chamber of Mines' chosen recruiting agents in south China, 
who were based in Hong Kong, felt sufficiently confident of the smooth working of the 
Hong Kong system to agree to contract over 4,000 labourers a month at an annual rate 
of 50,000 men when originally approached by Perry, the chairman of the Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association (WNLA), although this was subsequently cancelled on the 
initiative of the Chamber of Mines. (18) As the acting Governor of the Colony stated 
in June 1904: 
"Coolies come forward readily if the port of embarkation 
is Hong Kong, partly on account of long established 
emigration from here, and also owing to their full 
confidence in rotection afforded by British 
officers. It (197 
That this confidence was often misplaced may be judged from a report in the South 
China Mornirg Post which, in reporting on some successful prosecutions against known 
kidnappers, stated that 
"whilst the case revealed a widespread conspiracy 
aimed at evading the Ordinance [of 18891 it also 
revealed considerable official slacknesstt. (20) 
Much effort has gone into explaining the character of the bulk of this 
emigrant traffic from south China as "freet1. Though many questions are obviously 
begged by this definition, it is usually taken to denote the absence of any restraining 
indenture of contract. The Anglo-Chinese Labour Convention of MW 1904 applied only 
to those classes of labourers designated as indentured. (21) The Registrar General 
at Hong Kong and the Protector of Chinese at Singapore were both officially charged, 
amongst other duties, with ensuring the free nature of the emigrant's passage. Yet 
the evidence suggests that in most cases the distinction was a hard one to maintain. 
As the British Consul at Pakhoi' observed in relation to emigration to Mumtok (sic) 
on the island of Banca (sic) in the Dutch East Indies: 
"The emigration from Pak-hoi, under the actual 
conditions, is of an anomalous character. The 
coolies whilst shipped as free passengers are 
really in the position of indentured emi-ts. 
They cannot on lmding choose their employer or 
employment and the cost of their passage etc. is 
defrayed by the labour either of which incidents lsic] 
is conclusive that they are not free passengers." (22) 
The Chinese Consul at Singapore, Sun Shih-tfing, elaborated a similar tale from the 
island entrep8t, the distributing centre of the south-east Asian immigrant traffic: 
"After sale at the emigrant station the purchaser 
takes them [the immigrants] to the Chinese 
Protectorate to be orally questioned and to sign a 
contract and for each man a fee $1.40 is charged. 
When these measures were first introduced it was 
originally arraaged that if a coolie was unwilling 
[to enter into a contract] he could pay $16 passage 
money and redeem himself from the station. But as 
those from the interior are not intelligible they 
are intimidated by the bystanders, and so cannot 
speak out while the interpreter at his will reverses 
all he says. Thus those who redeem themselves are 
but few." (23) 
The blurring of the lines was everywhere apparent in respect of the emigrant traffic. 
As in Singapore the Protector abetted the sale of immigrants, so at Eong Kong the 
Transvaal Eknieation Agent there (itself a defiance of the 1904 convention) was 
employed to enquire into the free choice of men recruited by agents for the Chamber 
under his licence. (24) 
The British Consul-General at Canton, at the height of the difficulties over 
the South African emigration, admitted that progress since 1847 had been slow and 
arduous and that tlserious abuses still exist in connection with coolie emigration". (25) 
In fact, the atmosphere of corruption and violence which surrounded Chinese emigration 
was an integral part of a labour market whose source of supply depended on chronic 
poverty and whose pace was determined by the speculative profits of mercantile capital. 
The inter-connection between adequate supplies of labour and poverty was everywhere 
apparent, a factor which did not escape the experienced eye of the investigators for 
the Chamber of Mines. Ross Skinner, in his report to the boards of the Chamber of 
Mines and WNLII, aoserted confidently that 
"Chinese labouz' . . . can be obtained in unlimited numbers, 
an especially in the vicinity of the coast towns, an 
enormous proportion of the population is practically 
unemployed. (26) 
The demand for emigrant ships which this background of famine and dislocation implied 
created a market in which the drive to monopoly was pursued with a peculiar 
ruthlessness. Competition for this traffic and its outcome could often have a very 
real effect on emigzxmts8 ability to escape from their predicament. In l904 there 
was a mrkea decline in the number of emigrants leaving Swatow for Bangkok and the 
Straits Settlements, compared with the 1903 figures. This was due mainly to the 
withdraw-al of exceptional facilities for cheap passage offered by the competition for 
the trade between rival shipping firms. Indeed, with the establishment of 8 Nord 
Deutscher ZLoyd monopoly, rates to Southeast Asia reverted to their previous level 
and the number of emigrants fell off accordingly. (27) 
It has been necessary to dwell on the pattern of emigrant traffic in south 
China at the turn of the last century at some length, in order to place in a true 
perspective the arrangements which the Chamber of Mines made in regard to their 
recrukting activities, and to explain the expectations aJnd attitudes which were likely 
to be encountered amongst those actively engaged in the business. It has also been 
necessary to illustrate that it would have been economically asld strategically unsound 
for the Chamber of Mines not to have placed some degree of reliance on this pre- 
established system of emigration. 
Before assessing the extent of the mining capitalists~ependence upon the 
south China labour market, it must be emphasized that the Chamber of Mines bought 
their way into this traffic in advance of any significant changes in arrangements to 
control what was essentially a recrudescence of large-scale government organized 
indenturea emigration akin to the West Indian experiments of 1853 and 1874. (28) In 
this matter of timing, the Chamber, from their own point of view, proved to be 
particularly unfortunate. When circumstances were altered, their rooa for manoeuvre 
was shown to be severely curtailed by their precipitate action. A serious contradiction 
developed in the Chamber's position in south China, between their imperative desire for 
labour and the inability of their institutional arra;ngements to meet this need. Indeed, 
it was beyond the power of the Chamber of Mines, except in a limited degree, to resolve 
this conflict locally - the active support of local anlb metropolitan imperialist state 
power notwithstanding, 
This situation is surprising if one examines the degree to which the Chamber 
of Mines was organized for its assault on the China market. Thorough investigation in 
the Transvaal and the Far East had been conducted privately by the Chamber of Mines 
into both the ideal composition of the labour force on the mines (29) and, given the 
necessity of an Asiatic component to this (30), the best wa;y of securing it to meet 
the exigencies of the post-war mining situation. (31) From February 1903 (32), over 
a year before the signing of the Anglo-Chinese Labour Convention, the Chamber of Mines 
pushed ahead with its arraagements to tap the sources of the Chinese labour market. 
Between then and the end of the year no less than four highly qualified mining men in 
the direct employ of the Chamber or its agents visited the Far East. The information 
supplied by Ross Skinner, Herbert-Noyes, F. Perry, and J. G. Hamilton not only 
confirmed the estimates of the numbers available in China previously supplied by 
unsolicited quotations from "brokersff (33) but also became the basis upon which the 
firm contracts were allocated. (34) As Perry stated in an interview given to the 
Standard newspaper in January 1905: 
"Initially, arrangements were made with leading British 
f i m  to utilize their existing trading connections in 
the interior to further the emigration ente rise by 
giving it some semblance of bona fides . l 1  (33 
Not only the timing but also the pattern of these arrangements give insight 
into the strategy of the mining houses. Despite their full knowledge of the 
potentialities of the southern provinces, the ChamBer endorsed P e m p s  decision to have 
potential access to the whole of eastern China, from Manchuria southward. Butterfield 
and Swim (36) were given the agency for the south of China up to and includin$' the 
port of Swatow. The central provinces were divided between the firms of Sardine 
Matheson & CO and Gibb, Livingstone & Co. (37) For the northern provinces four firms 
were chosen, based on Chefoo, Shantung province, and Tient~in~ r i  province: 
namely, CornabQ Eckford & CO and Silas-SchwabQ & CO at Chefoo 38 , and William Porbes 
& CO and the Chinese Engineering and Mining Co. at Tientsin. 39 The extent of the 
Chasnberts interest in the China labour market was thw very considerable from the 
outset of their operations. In addition to these arrangements, however, Perry made a 
very revealing statement to the Standard in the course of the interview mentioned 
above. He said that the Chamber had originally expected 
llSouthern China would be the principal source of 
supply of coolie labom for the Transvaal because 
of the past history of emigration from these 
provinces , . .l1 (40) 
The d e p e  of sophistication in a policy which combined a thorough knowledge 
and appreciation of risks in a virtually new labour market can hardly be overemphasized. A 
larm labour mazkethsured the Chamber against localized difficulties. It also obviated 
t o  some degree the dangers inherent in its dependence on local intermediaries: 
alternative sources of supply offered protection against monopolistic rates for labour 
recruitment whilst rivalry between local firms, especially in the north, held out 
prospects for efficient activity on the Chamber's behalf. It is not without 
significance in the latter context, therefore, that the one place where this 
competition within the Chamber's arrangements did not work to their advantage was in 
the south. Ovex+dependence on one firm became a serious obstacle which ultimately 
forced the mining houses into a position of choosing between protracted negotiation or 
abandonment of a significant portion of their labour market. 
To understand why the Chamber, in all other respects so efficient and 
concerned for its own interests, found itself in this position, it is necessary to 
appreciate precisely what advantages their sole agents in the south offered. 
Butterfield and Swire had, in the first place, the great advantage of being brokers 
based in the three ports most likely to serve as entrepbts for the southern emigration: 
Amoy (41), Swatow (42) and Hong Kong. Furthermore, the severity of the competition for 
the south China labour market made the usual balancing arrangements within the 
Chmberfs orgranisation apparently unnecessary as a meana of securing efficiency. As 
the British Consul-General at Canton observed: 
"In fact it was evident that South Africa would, so 
far as the Canton province is concerned, compete 
seriously with more locaL demands . . .l1 (43) 
Again, not insipificantly, the firm was well known to the Chinese authorities and did 
not possess the stigma usually attached to those involved in the business of recruiting 
emigrants. Even Chaag T+jen, Chinese Minister in London and no friend of the brokers, 
was loth to believe that "a house of the character of Butterfield and Swire" could have 
been involved directly in the illegal recruiting activities in Kw-tung province in 
l904 which so materially increased the difficulties of the Chamberis position there.(44) 
In addition, Butterfield and Swire, with a wide variety of local contacts in shipping 
and other forms of trading, could offer the benefits of brokerage, shipping agents and 
food suppliers at the saae place. In this situation, location at Hong Kong was a real 
benefit as the special advantages of that port as an emigrant entrepbt could be 
combined with the protection of British Colonial power. All the benefits of the 
emigcant traffic could be tapped without any necessity for Chinese government 
interference. It would, as Ivlilner said, "be no more than other colonies k v e  doing 
for yearsu. (45) In the circumstances of an impending regulatory Labour Convention, 
this had obvious advantages. 
If these advantages preceded the signing of the Convention, they were assumed 
to be enhanced by its introduction. Although the conditions of the agreement were a 
tightening of pre-existing ones in relation to indentured migration, they related only 
to engagement at the Treaty Ports and did not cover Hong Kong or Wei-hai-wei. (46) It 
did not relate to emigrants t'freelytt presenting themselves at Hong Kong for 
indenture, nor did it apparently preclude a satisfactory arzangement, perhaps 
presented "with a little firmnesstt ,(47), being made for traashipment with the local 
authorities at Canton. (48) Further, in so fa as Butterfield& were concerned, it 
emphasized and institutionalized their pattern of labour catchment outside the 
Colony. Treaty Ports had for decades been the focal points of the emigrant traffic, 
as either embarkation or transhipment ports. Under Article 1, this pattern received 
official Chinese and British sanction. The Chamber seemed to have every reason to 
be satisfied both with the foresight and the comprehensiveness of its arrangements, 
for within days of the signature of the Convention the SS "Tweeddale" sailed from 
Bong Kong, on 25th Ma;y 1904, with the first emigrants for the Transvaal, an 
implicit reco@;nition of the power of fact over legality. (49) 
Yet this was the only Pull shipment to be recruited in south China for the 
Transvaal gold mines. Southern Chinese made up a diminishing proportion of only two 
subsequent shipmente. (50) By April 1905 the Rnipation Agancy in Hong Kong was 
practically deeerted, and the Transvaal Ehiption Agent, Cowan, returned to the 
Straits. (51) The collapse of the Chamberts plans in the south had come remarkably 
quickly, and at one point threatened to bring the whole scheme to a halt. (52) 
Despite repeated attempts to break the deadlock, the Chamber was finally forced to 
admit defeat and, effectively abandon the south. (53) 
Most explanations advanced for this abrupt change in the outlook of the 
southern Chinese labour market tell us more about the preoccupations of their authors 
than they do about what actually happened to the Chamber of Mines! attempts to 
mobilize labour there between May 1904 and April 1905. Denoonvs treaknent is a case 
in point. (54) Basing his argument for the emergence of a northern dominated 
emigration to the South African mines on one consular Intelligence report, he falls, 
for want of corroborative evidence, wide of the mark. In a general attempt to 
illustrate the cupidity and greed of the mine-owners (admittedly, not a difficult 
task), he is at pains to explain the absence of southerners by the unattractive terns 
of the contract presented during recruiting operations. (55) He takes no account of 
the fact that at the outset of the emigration, whilst recruiting for the "Tweeddale" 
shipment was in progress, the recruiting depot at Laichikok, Kowloon, was, 
according to newspaper reports, besieged by intending emigrants. (56) Denoon makes 
no acknowledgement of the opposition which was generated by rival broking firms on 
the basis of the intense competition which the South African emigration encountered 
in a position of labour shortage. (57) This line of explanation was open to Denoon, 
as it is hinted at by Campbell, a book he purports to have read. (58) FLurther, he 
makes no real evaluation of the arguments cited by the Vice-Consul. in the consular 
Intellimnce report in question. An examination of the claims made in that document 
does not warrant the unreserved confidence being placed in it. The report starts 
with a claim that "Northern Chinamen have hitherto never emigrated". (59) Whilst 
the relatively small volume of northern emigration to Vladivostok and Korea, and the 
seasonal character of population movement to Manchuria, are not in dispute, it is 
clearly a dubious claim to discount these facts altogether as manifestations of 
emigration. Further, the Consulls claim that southern Chinese were their own masters 
in the Straits Settlements, the Malw Straits, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, 
and British North America is clearly incorrect. Whilst it might be true in North 
America, as late as l9lO significant numbers of Chinese were indentured in the 
Federated &lay States (60), and the conditions in the Dutch East Indian 
plantations had become a public scandal. (61) The Report' S final illustration of 
events in south China is equally unconvincing. The failure of the Bench to recruit 
contract labourers for work in Yunnan on the French railway is taken as an indication of 
the temperamental unsuitability of southern Chinese to submit to the restraining 
fetters of indenture - hence the failure of the South African scheme. Yet all the 
other evidence points to a temperamental dislike on the part of the Chinese, both of 
the official and the labouring classes, for systematic and excessive cruelty. The 
Courier d'hiphong reported the return of Chinese from the Yunnrw railway 
"in a lamentably repulsive state. Wciated, suffering 
from fever and covered with sores, these unfortunate 
creatures give us an idea of the special kind of 
treatment meted out to them by the Public Works 
Department. " (62) 
Generally speaking, the consular report was written some time after the failure of 
the South Africaa scheme and by a Vice-Consul who was not involved as closely in the 
events which he tried to explain as he should have been to warrant Denoonqs trust in 
his reliability. Similarly, Reeves's castigation of the Chinese as "effete and 
inefficient" displays lamentable lack of critical faculty at best, inexcusable 
prejudice at worst. (63) Although his point about incipient nationalism is an 
interesting one, he wasted the opportunity of developing it further. Campbell is 
hampered more by lack of evidence than anything else, though she, too, makes some 
uncritical assumptions. For example, she cites Cowants claim that his recruitment 
licences issued to Butterfield and Swire were treated with the utmost contempt by 
the Canton Viceroy as a reason for the failure of the south China enterprise. (65) 
Clearly this is insufficient; one reason is possibly to be found in why the 
Viceroy acted in this manner. 
An important element in the explanation of the abrupt change in the 
Chamber's position in south China which occurred after May 1904, which has 
consistently been ignored to date, is the existence, after 13th May 1904, of the 
regulatory Labour Convention.(66) It would be naive to expect that this would in 
itself have effected a material change in the situation. The history of Chinese and 
Indian emigration is strewn with attempts at control which remained partially or 
totally inoperative. (67) The signature and publication of the Convention did, 
however, create a medium through which various hostilities and conflicts could 
effectively be articulated. To understand how and why this was possible, it is 
necessary to appreciate something of the ambiguities which were implicit in the more 
important articles of the Convention. 
Articles I and V defined the application of the agreement to indentured 
emigration to be conducted at the Treaty Ports. This highlighted the anomalous 
position of Butterfield and Swire as recruiters of indentured labour operating from 
an unprotected colonial. port. (68) The British Legation in Peking had been quick to 
see the dangers in this situation: 
' I . . .  the wording of Article V of the Convention is so 
precise that it seems impossible to contend that Hong 
Kong was meant to be recognized as a port of 
embarkation. It would be useless to attempt to 
induce the Central Government to enlarge the scope of 
a Convention so recently concluded and a formal 
refusal from the Wai-wu-pu would only result in 
closing the door to local arrangements with the 
Viceroy. (69) 
Yet Hong Kong was the finest deep sea port in south China, and Butterfield and Swire 
were agents for one of the largest shipping lines there. Further, the geographical 
proximity of the Colony to all southern Chinese Treaty ports made the pressures for 
transhipment facilities from these very great. Thus, on 23rd September 1904, 
Butterfield and Swire requested from the British Consulate at Amoy: 
"to be permitted to send coolies in small batches to 
Hong Kong rather than incur the lost time involved 
in having a steamer wait for collection of coolies 
up (70) 
Articles 11, 111, TV, and V111 allowed for the appointment of a Chinese 
Lnspector and a British Consular Delegate to watch over the whole business of 
engagement and embarkation at an appointed Treaty Port. Again, the anomalous position 
of Hong Kong was emphasized by these articles. Further, the Hong Kong government was 
in no way well disposed towards having Chinese officials exercise any jurisdiction 
within its boundaries (71), whilst the appointment of a Transvaal aigration Agent as 
Consular Delegate at the Colony increased the likelihood of a conflict of British 
authority. It was also a situation in which there was little legal basis 
for the activities of the bigration Agent. (72) This potential conflict of power 
was f'urther complicated by Article V I ,  which allowed, in the interests of "the better 
protection of the emigrant, and of aqy other Chinese subjects who may happen to be 
residing in the Colony or Protectorate to which the emigration is to take place"(73), 
for the appointment of a resident Chinese consul or vice-consul. This, as the Hong Kong 
Telemaph po:LnJied out, expressly avoided the issue of resident Chinese comular 
jurisdiction in Hong Kong. (74) Given the controversy over this issue, and a similar 
one at Singapore in which the Chinese were given this ri&t, it is not surprising 
that this was one of the demands which the Chinese successfully exploited to prize 
apart the alliance between the Hong Kong government and the representatives of the 
Transvaal emigration business. (75) 
Articles XI and XXII also emphasized the practical difficulties inherent in 
thedesignation of Eong Kong as the embarkation port under the terms of the Labour 
Convention. In respect of the former, repatriation only to the Chinese port of 
embarkation was likely to cause serious hardship for those returning destitute and 
facing up-country transhipment before making their way home. Hong Xong also escaped 
the latter clausets stipulation that pwents of $3 Mexican per emigrant up tn 
10,000 emigrants in a.ny one year (and $2 Mexican per migrant in excess of that number 
in any one year) from any one port were payable to the Chinese government. 
To add to these implicit diffioulties, the local arrangements adopted by 
the Chamber of Mines) agents and the British government were complex and inefficient. 
The British Consul deputed under Article I to appoint a delegate was the one at Canton. 
This deputy, Cowan, the Transvaa.1 Emlpation Agent, was resident at Laichikok, 
Kowloon - a long ww down the Pearl River. (77) Geopaphical distance was compounded 
by a conflict between British government policy in respect of Hong Kong and the 
Transvaal. The British wvernment consistently adopted a policy of non-interference 
in relation to the Transvaal Einigmtion Agency, once the labour market had effectively 
been guaranteed by the Convention. (78) In the south China situation this was 
aggravated by the interests of the Hong Kong government, to which, in the case of 
conflict over the Transvaal emigration business, the Consuls deferred. Thus Consul 
Campbell at Hong Kong stated: 
"1 am acting throughout with the Governor of Hong Kong 
who I understand keeps the Colonial Office fully 
informed by telegraph." (79) 
Further, the arrangements of the Chamber of Mines, however rational from their own point of 
view, failed, despite the securing of some monopsonistic advantages, to eliminate the 
hierarchy of load inmtermediaries who cont~lled the recruiting business: Butterfields 
were always working at two steps removed from the actual recruiting business. (80) 
It would be wrong to hply that the situation waa totally rigid - at one 
moment all was smooth for the Chamber, and then, with the publication of the Convention, 
they ran headlong into all manner of opposition. There were signs of covert opposition 
to emigration to South Africa in the north (81), and in the south of China (82) as 
early as Movember 1903. By April and May 1904, particularly around the old recruiting 
grounds of Canton and Amoy (83), a virulent poster campaign was underway. At the 
latter port a particularly influential placard appeared in the early part of 1904 by 
one Chten Dag, entitled "An exhortation to refrain from emigration to the savage 
lands of lNew Foochowl sic] , Kuyao sic] Mexico, Manila and the Transvaal in South 
Africa". (84) The language was reminiscent of the virulently xenophobic placards which 
had greeted Westerners throwout the nineteenth century at the various treaty 
ports (85), and skilfully combined truth, hyperbole and falsehood effectively to smear 
emigration to South Africa from that port. Yet, in so far as the Chamber's operations 
generally in south China were concerned, this opposition was or marginal effect. 
Recruiting proceeded with noticeable success up until 25th Nay, when the "Tweeddale" 
sailed. Thereafter, the Convention enabled both local and central Chinese governments 
to articulate their opposition to %his particular form of Western intrusion, and thereby 
emboldened other sources of opposition and enhanced weakllesses in the Chambercs position. 
The notion of a single cause and effect situation in south China, as implied by Denoon, 
could not be further from the truth. 
The nature of the position of the Chinese central governnent:and its opposition to 
the South African emigration scheme should be elaborated with some care. In one sense, 
there was no effective opposition: at one time over 53,000 Chinese were at work in 
the Transvaal gold mines, Yet this was an admission more of the realities of British 
imperialist power khan a willing consent to emigration. The Wai-m-pu put this with 
clarity to the Superintendents of Northern and Southern Trade: 
"The Board would point out that the engagement of 
coolies by Englishmen is an act which is permitted 
by Treaty, and to prevent them doing so is, therefore, 
bpossible. (86) 
The Labour Convention formed a means of circumscribing that power, of running it into 
the sand. This policy, based largely on the thinking of Chang Ta-jen, Chinese 
Minister in London (W), was adopted by the Peking Government in March 1904: 
' l . . .  H.E. Chmg's wish to draw up special regulations 
on the subject with the 13ritish Foreign Office and 
his request that no ooolies be permitted to proceed 
until these regulations are drawn up, show that he is 
not a man who lacks experience. (88) 
A breach of the Convention, under these circumstances, was likely to be strenuously 
opposed, thaw not necessarily successfully opposed. This theme ran throughout the 
negotiations both for the Conve~tion and the long drawn out battle to secure 
its local application in Kwangtung province. Thus Halliday McCartney felt constrained 
to accept the interpretation of the restriction of the Convention to the Treaty Ports 
as implying that an attempt to operate it from Hong Kong would be seen by the Chinese 
as an unfriendly act. (89) Only under constant pressure from the British government 
did the Wai-wu-pu agree to sanction the protective recruiting agreement for Kwanp 
tung province (go), although they succeeded in keeping it a dead letter by inserting 
too hi& demands into the concomitant transhipment regulation from Canton and H o w  
Kong. (91) The influence of the Chinese Minister in London was constant throughout 
these negotiations, and his intervention was decisive in vetoing the first transhipment 
agreement from Canton of 18th November 1904. (92) 
It is clear that the Chinese local mvernment made use of the central 
government~s position either as delaying tactics or as a means of reinforcing their 
own position. Thus, when the negotiations over the recruiting agmement (under Article I 
of the convention) seemed to be proceeding well for the Chamber of Mines early in 
September 1904, the Viceroy of the Two Kwanga referred the question to London, with the 
effect that on 3rd October the British Consul at Canton was forced to protest against 
the "very inconvenient" delw which still attended the proceedings. (93) Viceroy Ts'en 
Chun-hstlan,, however, exhibited an opposition to the Chambervs activities which, if 
fundamentally circumscribed by the same preconditions as those which animated Peking 
and London, differed quite substantially in @phasis and detail. Thus he was willing 
to consent to emi~ation controlled by the Chinese government from Kwangsi ProfT~ce, via 
Wuchow on the West River (94), but strenuously opposed a similar situation in 
Kwangtung. (95) Indeed, he was remarkably reluctant to sanction any kind of emipation 
scheme for Kwangtung province, the Anglo-Chinese Labour Convention notwiths tarading. (96) 
There were sound and eclectic reasons for this: the peasant revolt then raging in 
Kwmgei, and the appalling poverty there, formed the background to the Wuchow scheme. 
The Governor reasoned to his subjects that it was 
Itfar your [ownj good to seek some new means of 
livelihood which will provide you with food and 
clothing and bring peace to your countrysidett. (97) . 
The South African scheme, based on the finance of the recruiters, seemed to provide a 
convenient solution, in part, to the twin problems of economic dislocaLion and 
lawlessness. Furthemore, it provided a convenient pretext for holding up the more 
contentious Kwangtung~ arrangements. Whilst the Wuchow scheme remained operative, 
recruiting in Kwangbmg,and to a large extent emigration to South Africa in geneml, 
was at a standstill. (98) Kwaagtung province, on the other hand, was, temporarily at 
least, in the economically favourable position of having an excess of demand over 
supply in relation to overseas demand for labour, and therefore was in no dire need for 
government-mobilized emigration schemes to attempt to remove the surplus population. 
In September 1904, the British Consul at Canton observed that: 
"Latterly there has alwws been a demand for 9cooliesf 
fmm these places [i.e. KwangLung and Fukkien 
provinces] which the hongs have not been able to 
satisfy completely and this would tend to show that 
before South Africa moved into the field, Kwangtun~~; 
at least had little surplus labour which was not 
absorbed by Hong Kong, Mala~rsia and Indo-China." (99) 
Appreciation of the respective politico-economic advantages of emigration was not the 
only motive behind the Viceroy's policy of opposition to the Chamberls schemes in 
Kwangtung, Over and above a possible element of simple anti-foreignism (100) there 
was a real awareness of gruesome past experience with "coolie brokers" and the "pig 
tra,del', which had formed a considerable part of the indigenous population's experience 
of Western civilization from mid-century onwards. (101) Fear of political disquiet 
among& the scholar-gentry class and the populace was mingled with a profound dislike 
of the indignities inherent in this speculative business. (102) It would be totally 
misleading to assume a predominance of vindictiveness for the South African scheme on 
the part of the Viceroy of the Two Kwangs: emigration from Pakhoi to the Dutch East 
Indies, from Canton to the Straits Settlements, the Pacific Islands and Yunnan, and 
from Swatow to British North Borneo, was subject to a similar scrutiny and interference. 
Indeed, given T s ~ e n ~ s  virtual embargo on these other schemes, it mi&t be argued that 
he was in his own terms particularly favourable to the South Africans, or more aware 
of the weight of the various interests pressing on him. He effectively retarded their 
schemes but did not quash them altogether. The tradition of opposition was carried 
on by Tstenls successor, C h m g  Jen-chun, who in 1908 took effective steps to stop 
labourers from being recruited in Kwangtung to go to Brazil. (103) It is in this 
sense that one may possibly speak of the incipient nationalism mentioned by Reeves in 
relation to the failure of the Chamber's activity in Kwangtung. Tstenls actions bear 
some similarity to other late Chfing government assertions of national sovereignty.(l04) 
Having said &l1 this, one has to beware of making a monolithic interpretation 
of the actions of the Chinese local government, just as one has to distinguish between 
the policy of the central government and its senior agents in the provinces. That a 
wide spectrum of opinion and interest existed within the local government structure 
is obvious, but in respect of emigration, particularly to South Africa, there was an 
apparent concurrence of sentiment which could, and did, have startling results at 
times. Thus, whilst the Viceroy interpreted the Wuchow scheme as a means of disposing 
of brigandage and poverty, three of his district magistrates,at Kwei Yun, Pheng Lok 
and Chiu Phing in Kwangr~i, took this to be an ideal opportunity to rid themselves of 
the burdensome presence of 51 crimimls encumbering their respective goals. (105) 
Similarly, whilst recruiting for South Africa was proceeding in Kwang prior to the 
signature of the Convontion,"with the help of Chinese agencies of the same character as 
those which had been providing the labour supply to the Straits and elsewhere" (1061, the 
Chinese Military Secretariat, in response to local pressure against kidnapping, arrested 
seven people allegedly involved in the traffic to the Straits, and succeeded in 
indicting the San-ho-hsing recruiting agency, a Hong Kong based firm. (107) Not all 
local opposition and obstruction came from a shilar desire to further the cause of 
local economy or popular peace keeping. The British Consul at Wuchow attributed much 
of the lethargy to the feeling amongst local officials that they would personally be 
out of pocket from the use of Chinese official government machinery to mobilize labour 
for the Transvaal mines. (108) Other officials who possibly stood to gain from the 
payments made by the hongs in return for their connivance at the traffic also stood 
to gain little from the South African scheme. The freedom of the pre-Convention 
traffic stood in marked contrast to the envisaged protective clauses of the South 
African scheme, with its possibilities of unwelcome interference from other Chinese 
officials and representatives of the Western powers. As the Governor of Hong Kong 
remarked: 
"The small extent to which this very profitable business 
of recruiting - undoubtedly not carried out without 
serious irregularities, which from time to time come to 
lipSht - is interfered with by the Chinese Local 
Authorities, suggests that some of its profits go to 
those authorities. As soon as the South African trade 
was started a strong opposition was entered against it 
by the various labour hongs, who feared it would affect 
their business. Violent articles appeared in the 
Chinese press of Canton and Hong Kong, and when their 
effect was to some extent discounted by the Viceroy's 
proclamations, those, in their turn, were nullified 
or counteracted by the want of co-operation and 
concealed opposition of his subordinates and of other 
interested parties. 'l (109) 
It must be clear from the foregoing that there was no uniform pattern of 
Chinese respome to the demand for emigration to the Transvaal. There was a certain 
amount of favourable popular response at p s s  roots level initially, but this was 
skilfully diverted from its proposed channels uncEer the circumstances of rival sources 
of demand for emigrant labour. Thus many of the prospective recruits for the mines 
who "found their w q "  to Hong Kong before the departure of the SS "Tweedda1ef1 towards 
the end of May were crimped from the depot by rival firms and sent to other 
destinations. (110) At another level, this very popularity evoked a vicious and 
determined campaign from those who stood to lose their profits from this diversion of 
&gmnt traffic, as mentioned above. The H o w  Kong Telearaph reported that: 
llA very powerful guild is at work, either in Singapore 
or Penang, the aim of which is to prevent coolies from 
going to South Africa from Hong Kong." (111) 
In the circumstances of local power this was of real si&ficance: the merchants' 
ability to wage a press campaign and buy off levels of the government was a very 
important factor in the failure of the Chamber's southern Chinese enterprise. When 
these activities coincided with, and in part occasioned Chinese govement opposition, 
the Chamber's access to the state or private means of labour mobilization was severely 
and effectively curtailed. In the semi-colonial situation of late Chcing China, the 
co-operation of important elements of the Chinese ruling class was of great importance 
in securing the success of any kind of im;periaJist activity. 
Severe and da,maging as this Chinese opposition was, it could not, in the 
nature of things, be totally effective. Even the Wuchow scheme, abandoned by the 
Chamber of Mines on 18th November 1904 as ineffective (112), continued to produce 
emigrants even after the closure of the agency. Of those actually embarked on the 
three shipments containing southern Chinese labourers for the Transvaal mines, Kw- 
si men fomed 0.001 per cent, 2.86 per cent, and 14.83 per cent, respectively, of the 
complement. The last figuse refers to the SS qlIkbaltl, which did not reach Durban 
until 12th January 1905. (11 3)  The progressive underdevelopment and dislocation of 
the Chinese countryside and the attractive power of Transvaal mining capitalism 
combined to hold out possibilities of a limited but r e w a r  supply of southern 
Chinese labour. Yet the Chamber of Mines, on its own initiative, suspended its 
recruiting in south China on 2nd November 1904 (114) - just over four months after the 
arrival of the first emigrant ship from China, at Durban. The reasons for this 
decision must, therefore, be sought not only in the varieties of Chinese action, 
but also in the changing policies of the other participants in the South African 
scheme - namely the British government, the Hong Kong government, Butterfield and 
Swire, and the Chamber of Mines. For, as the slow movement in the south became 
increasingly apparent, so did the priorities of these participants change to 
accommodate their various interests. 
The British government policy throughout the attempts to open up the south 
of China faithfully reflect their initial position in respect of their interests in 
China and the Transvaal. Once they had facilitated the access of the mining 
capitalists to the Chinese labour market by negotiation of the Convention, they 
remained essentially committed to the position of non-interference. Their initiatives 
to secure wider privileges were,at best, half-hearted and originated in the first 
instance in pressures from the local interests. (115) Thus Colonial Secretary 
Iiyttelton declared that, whilst it remained open to Britain to ship emig&mts from 
H o w  Kong, 
"it would be contrazy to good policy to use this 
freedom in such a way as to obtain large numbers 
from Hong Kong and thereby deprive the Chinese 
Govoment of fees which they may fairly expect 
to reimburse their expenditure in respect of all 
labourers coming from China, ... For the general 
promotion of recruiting, we are dependent on the 
co-operation of the Chinese which we cannot expect 
if we continue to use Hong Kong as a permanent 
port of embarkation. On the contrary they will 
most probably make strong representations if this 
takes place and may attempt to hamper or stop 
emigration to the Straits as well as the Transvaal." (116) 
This general reluctance was tempered by two considerations: firstly, a desire to 
protect, within the ground circumscribed by the Convention, the interests of the 
colony of Hong Kong even when these demmded a more forward policy than was 
desirable (117); secondly, a desire to protect the gains of the Convention itself 
from erosion by the Chinese authorities. (118) This policy was reflected in varying 
shades by all the metropolitan government's agents, both in China and in Britain. 
Interestingly, the British Legation at Peking showed a noticeable reluctance to do 
more than was absolutely necessary for the South African scheme, often needing a prod 
from London before orientating itself to the interests of Eritain's newly won South 
African colony. (119) This passivity must, however, be understood for what it was: 
the provision of access to the labour market was clearly of crucial importance to the 
development of the South African scheme, and it cannot be said therefore that the 
British government was little more than a sleeping partner in these arrangements. 
After all, the metropolitan government went to considerable lengths to adjust the 
local workings of the Convention in south China to facilitate this access, and was 
stubborn in defence of its general terms when the contradiction in the arraqpments 
appeared to be giving the Chinese government facilities for erodiw the Convention. 
Further, the Convention actually made general the demands of the specific requirements 
of the most important economic elements in the Transvaal Colony: the terms of the 
agreement were applicable to all "British colonies or other parts beyond the seasW.(l20) 
This placed the Convention in the direct tradition of military interventionist 
violence, whose rationale stem from Article V of the Treaw of Peking, 1860, which 
in turn has direct links with the British West Indian sugar plantation lobby. (121) 
The Hong Kong government, of the British government agencies, seemed the 
most likely source of support for the Chamber of Mines: despite the Colony's 
anomalous position in respect of the Convention, by virtue of the recruiting and 
shipping arrangements which the mine-owners had adopted, it was most intimately 
involved. However, the sources of opposition opened up by the South African scheme 
threatened important vested interests being promoted under imperial patronage: the 
threat to the emig~ant traffic to the Straits which the activities of Butterfield and 
Swire in Kwan&ung posed was described with masterly understatement by the Governor 
of the Colony as llundesirablell. (121) Attempts to find ways round the various 
difficulties also placed the Colonial government in a difficult position: thus, they 
vetoed the suggestion that the island of Whampoa should become the embarkation point 
for &migrants to South Africa, on the basis that it would result in "the transfer of 
emigration business from this colony to Whampoa" (123) and open up the possibility 
of a rival deep-sea port,under Chinese auspices, close to Canton. (124) Furthermore, 
the attempted solutions and their attendant difficulties threatened new British 
protected developments which had a more direct and lasting stake in China, itself. 
Thua, Nathan explained his concurrence in the abandoning- of attempts to secure 
transhipment facilities from Canton for the Transvaal scheme on the gmunds that: 
I'It is obviously inadvisable, from the point of view of 
the Colony's interests, to proceed in the discussion 
with the Chinese Authorities to the point where threats 
of some retaliatory action became necessary, especially 
at the time when delicate negotiations for the Canton- 
Kowloon railway are being initiated with them." (125) 
Therefore the colonial government, for one reason or another, gave only limited and 
vacillating support to the South African scheme, though at the outset it had appeared 
as the ideal ally in the Chamber's plans. 
Butterfield and Swire@s position was, as has been indicated, one of 
apparent strength which masked critical weaknesses. When the crisis in their 
activities over the South African business came to a head, this forced them into 
actions which intensified the contradictions i n  their and the Chamber's position. 
Their wide range of material interests and shipping connections gave them a certain 
amount of local leverage. Also, their good standing with the local officials was of 
use during the early stages of negotiations to remove the Viceroyls discouragement 
of emigration to South Africa. (126) However, their presence in the field 
represented a serious threat to other bmking firms in the emigrant traffic. (127) 
In addition, their dependence upon a relatively passive or vacillating source of 
state power to overcome their ambiguous position under the Convention was a serious 
weakness. (128) Further, the economic structure of their relationship with the 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines (W later the CMLIA) was one of constant difficulty. 
The firm's direct responsibility for the costs of the Wuchow depot and the projected 
depot at Canton, and the fees for the compradore to facilitate recruiting in Kwang- 
tung and for the government agents in Kwangsi, meant that a considerable outlay with 
precious little results threatened to be the sum total of the fimrs involvement with 
the South African scheme. (129) 
. 
These pressures became acute when the question of demurrage on a ship 
waiting at Hong Kong, the SS "Lothian1', arose in late August and early September. 
From mid-- onwaxds Butterfield's attempts to sec- an adequate supply of labourers 
had been constantly frustrated. Initially, the Viceroy had refused to sanction the 
Convention. (130) Only in early July was this barrier removed, by which time local 
government and private opposition to the South African scheme had become well 
established in Kwa.ngtung. (131) - To add to these difficulties, the Viceroyts change 
of heast mlated only to Kwangsi province, and the Wuchow scheme which resulted from 
this was not only a failure in terns of numbers but also had the effect of forestalling 
arrangements for the opening up of Kwangtung to officially recognized recruiting 
agents. (132) One ship, the SS "C~urtfield'~ had already been diverted to the north 
without a single southern emigrant on board, after six weeks' delay. (133) Thus, 
when the Chamber decided to charter the SS "Lothianw at Hong Xong for another attempt 
at a southern shipment, the pressure to deliver e n o w  men, and in time to meet the 
conditions of the chaster party, became acute. (134) The result was an undercover 
mobilization of Butterfield's agents for activity in Kwangrtung province. (135) 
The plan became badly unstuck when, on 3rd September, five recruiting agents were 
discovered by the Canton government and arrested. (136) The aftermath had all the 
makings of a serious diplomatic incident as it was, in effect, a complete breach of 
all tacit arra.ngements by the firm to refrain from mobilizing labour in Kwaagtung 
province until a satisfactory arrangement had been negotiated with the Cantonese 
authorities overcoming the latter's various objections to the existing 
arrangements. (137) The incident was saved from becoming more serious by the timely 
apologies of those principally involved - namely the Transvaal Ehigration Agent and 
Law of Butterfield and Swire. (138) The rapid exposure of all the weaknesses of 
Butterfield and Swim's position in the South African scheme occasioned a total 
reappraisal by the firm of its standing in the business. Their opposition to the 
Wuchow scheme became increasingly vociferous (139), and the firm did not demur at 
the Chamberfs decision to suspend the project on 18th November. (140) Likewise, 
opposition to details of the recruiting agreement (141), painfully worked out by the 
British Consul in October and so urgently sought by Butterfields only a month before, 
foreshadowed a shilar acquiescence in the Chamber's decision to suspend private 
recruiting in south China on 2nd November 1904. (142) Denied active government 
support, except from the Transvaal Government Agent, himself a compromised and 
dependent Individual, and lacking the leverage which the Chamber of Mines' support 
in South Africa would have assured them, this change of heart is not to be wondered 
at. 
The position of the Transvaal ESaigration Agent, Cowan, the Hong Kong 
representative of the Foreign Labour Department of the Transvaal Colony, was also one 
of acute weakness and was of little use to the SJmmber in attempting toforce the issue 
against the Canton authorities. By virtue of his geographical position in breach of the 
Convention, he lacked both the fullness of control over vital areas of the emigration 
traffic a,nd the diplomatically convenient claim of a supervisory role. Necessaxily 
in collusion with the Chamber of Mines! enterprise, he was identified with all the 
weaknesses of Butterfield's position without any of the compensating strengths which 
usually come from being a representative of state power. (143) 
The position of the Chamber of Mines was a curious one. They had large 
vested interests in the success of the southern Chinese scheme. They were chaxeable 
for the maintenance expenses of those Chinese who had been recruited and kept at the 
depot pending the departure of the SS '"I'weeddaleff. They were also financially liable 
for those Chinese who had.been mobilized for the mines for the "Lothiann and 
"Ikbal" shipments. (144) 'Ihey had incurred heavy liabilities in respect of 
contracts issued to shipping firms, some of which were to operate from the south. (145) 
Yet the de-e of opposition displayed in south China and the weakness of their agents 
at ]How Kong, when viewed in .the light of the rising tide of success in the north 
of the country, wexe significant faotors in pemuading the Chamber to make a positive 
step actually to suspend operations in the south. (146) The outbreak of beri-beri 
amongst significant proportions of the first two shipments of southern Chinese, 
frequently cited as the sole cause of the decision to abandon the south, was merely 
instrumental in persuading the mine-owners to stop active engagement in the south.(147) 
Even then the Chamber refused to abandon the south indefinitely: not only did they 
include another 236 southerners on the SS "3kbalw (1481, but they specifically 
reserved the right to re-enter the southern Chinese labour market. Lt Governor Lawley 
stated to the British government on 15th Ma;y 1905 that, although the CMLLA did not 
contemplate re-opening recruiting in southern China through Hong Kong "for the 
present", it was not prepared to bind itself so that recruiting in the south was 
abandoned for all the. (149) This is hardly surprising in view of the three-pronged 
attack on the Chinese labour market which had characterized the Chamber's entry into 
south China in the first place. As events turned out, the Chamberls decision to 
suspend operations did in fact amount to abandoning of the south. When the last 
shipment of Chinese arrived in South Africa in January 1907, no southern Chinese had 
been brought to work in the Transvaal gold mines for two yeam. 
The extent of Chinese emigration from south China at the beginning of the 
twentieth century made it the natural focal point of the Chamber of Mineslrecruiting 
activities in China. Economic constraints of labour costs made a total dependence on 
a relatively small and competitive labour market unwise. Thus northern and southern 
recruitment were conjointly instituted, with the south being opened up first as the 
anticipated leading source of supply. The unexpected degree of Chinese opposition, 
official and otherwise, which crystallized amund the passing of the Convention, 
together with the passivity and half-heartedness 02 simple weakness of the Chamberls 
natural and necessary allies, the agents of the British imperialist state, made 
progress difficult and ultimately impossible. The economic cost of a medically poor 
work force, in these circumstances, made active recruitment an obviously poor decision, 
and the operation in the south, once success in the north was assured, was consequently 
abandoned. 
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